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Putri Malynda Kartika Sari 
Supervisor:  
Imam Subekti, Ph.D., Ak., CA. 
 
The agency conflicts between the controlling shareholder and the non-controlling 
shareholder will lead expropriation because of the concentrated ownership 
structure that occurred in Indonesia. This research primarily aims to examine the 
effect of multiple large shareholder and corporate governance on expropriation 
with family ownership as moderating variable among Indonesian public 
companies. The population research is Indonesian public companies. Sample is 
selected using purposive sampling technique resulted in 97 samples. The results 
show that multiple large institutional shareholder and corporate governance give a 
negative affect to the expropriation. While, family ownership not affect to the 
expropriation. This study contributes to agency theory type II, conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders, which can be overcome through corporate 
governance. 
Keywords: 
Expropriation, Related Party Transaction,  Multiple Large Institutional 







































PENGARUH MULTIPLE LARGE INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER 
DAN TATA KELOLA TERHADAP EKSPROPRIASI DENGAN DI 
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Konflik keagenan yang terjadi di Indonesia antara pemegang saham pengendali 
dan pemegang saham non-pengendali menyebabkan terjadinya praktik 
ekspropriasi dikarenakan struktur kepemilikan terkonsentrasi yang terjadi di 
Indonesia. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh multiple large 
institutional shareholder dan mekanisme tata kelola terhadap praktik ekspropriasi 
di perusahan publik Indonesia dengan dimoderasi kepemilikan keluarga. Populasi 
di dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahan publik di Indonesia. Pemilihan sampel 
menggunakan teknik purposive sampling menghasilkan 97 sampel. Hasil dari 
penelitian ini menunjukan bahwa multiple large institutional shareholder dan tata 
kelola berpengaruh negative terhadap ekspropriasi. Sedangkan, kepemilikan 
keluarga tidak berpengaruh terhadap ekspropriasi. Penelitian ini berkontribusi 
pada teori agensi tipe II yang membahas konflik pemegang saham pengendali dan 
non-pengendali, yang dapat diatasi dengan menggunakan mekanisme tata kelola. 
Kata kunci: 
Ekspropriasi, Transaksi Pihak Berelasi,  Multiple Large Institutional 


































1.1     Background 
The main objective of a company is to increase the prosperity of shareholders 
or company owners and maximize the value of the company. In achieving this goal, 
the company must be managed properly and professionally. The company 
shareholders usually hand over the management of the company to the management 
(directors) of the company because they are considered more competent and have 
more information about the condition of the company. 
According to agency theory, managers in public companies tend to prioritize 
their interests, and not focus on maximizing shareholder wealth. This condition raises 
distrust between the two parties which triggers the presence of conflict. The conflict 
is later known as agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency conflict raises 
agency costs, which ultimately must be borne by the company's shareholders. 
Agency conflicts that occur in Indonesia are different from those in America 
and Europe. However, Agency conflicts that occurred in the United States and Europe 
occurred between management and shareholders (Type I), while agency conflicts in 
Indonesia occurred between the majority shareholders (controlling) and minority 
shareholders (non-controlling) (Type II) ( Villalonga & Amit 2006). This is due to 





















concentrated ownership structure, while countries in the United States and Europe are 
spread ownership structures. Concentrated ownership of companies results in control 
rights and cash flow rights on certain parties as controlling shareholders, such as 
families and government. This creates the potential for controlling shareholders to be 
further involved in managing the company (La-Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997) and has the possibility to transfer funds from one company 
to another with the aim of benefiting the controlling shareholders (Friedman, 
Johnson, and Mitton, 2003). Conditions like this provide a gap for controlling 
shareholders to carry out expropriation practices that will harm minority shareholders. 
One of the methods commonly used by controlling shareholders to expropriate non-
controlling shareholders' wealth is through related party transactions (RPT) which can 
also be in the form of tunnelling. This phenomenon shows that the protection of the 
rights of minority shareholders is still low so that the expropriation practice is carried 
out by the majority shareholders. 
To reduce agency conflict and agency costs can be done by, first, increasing 
managerial ownership. Agency problems can be reduced if the manager has share 
ownership, with the managerial share ownership will act cautiously because it feels 
directly the result of the decision taken so that managerial does not do opportunistic 
actions. The second is using external supervision through the use of debt. An increase 
in debt use will affect the composition of capital. With debt, the company is obliged 





















who have excess cash flow and not optimal investments. The existence of debt 
encourages managers to enjoy fewer and more efficient profits, with debt a warning 
of the risk of bankruptcy, loss of control and reputation. The next is the ownership of 
external shareholders (institutional investors and other Large External Shareholders) 
as monitoring agents. Bathala et al (1994) stated that institutional share ownership as 
a monitoring agent plays an important, active and consistent role in protecting stock 
investors of the company. Furthermore, McCornell and Servaes (1995) found that the 
composition of shares owned by Large External Shareholders and institutional 
ownership has a positive effect on firm value. 
Shareholders in the company can consist of several controlling, majority and 
minority shareholders as well as family, institutional, government and public 
ownership. Concentrated ownership conditions with different structures are called 
Multiple Large Shareholders (MLS), which can consist of controlling shareholders 
and non-controlling shareholders / other majority shareholders. Other majority 
shareholders take the role of supervising and overseeing the management and also the 
controlling shareholders in the company's decision making. The existence of other 
majority shareholders is then an obstacle for controlling shareholders and 
management to collude in expropriating minority shareholders (Attig et al. 2008). The 
other majority shareholders are generally in the form of institutional investors. 
Subsequent developments that need to be considered are the rights of minority 





















weak legal protection for shareholders (Hung, 2000). It is indicated by expropriations 
cases occurring in Indonesia that harm minority shareholders, such as the case of PT. 
Sumalindo indo Lestari Jaya Tbk (SULI) in 2011-2013. This case began when Deddy 
Hartawan as a minority shareholder felt aggrieved by the transfer of 60% of the 
shares of a SULI subsidiary below the market price and without informing to 
shareholders general meeting. They also never mentioned the profits made by PT 
SULI’s subsidiary in the financial report. This is possible because of the conspiracy 
between the directors and the majority shareholders associated with PT SULI. The 
fact that the relationship between PT SULI's directors and controlling majority shares 
strongly influences all policies that are one-sided and harm the interests of minority 
shareholders or the public. From this case, it can be concluded that there is still a lack 
of protection of the rights of minority shareholders related to the expropriation 
practice done by the majority shareholders. 
Good corporate governance (GCG) is one of the pillars of the market 
economy system and is closely related to the good trust in the practicing companies 
and the business climate of a country. The concept of Corporate Governance 
essentially requires better transparency for all users of financial statements which if 
successfully implemented properly will automatically improve the company's 
performance. Corporate governance systems can provide protection to shareholders 
and creditors for the investments made. Corporate governance can also create a 





















Kirindaran (2007) stated that the concept of Corporate Governance includes controls 
and procedures that ensure that the actions taken by management or agents are actions 
that follow the interests of shareholders or investors. After Indonesia's economic 
conditions begin to improve, Good Corporate Governance becomes increasingly 
intensified. The Government also immediately invites business people to continue to 
socialize and implement Good Corporate Governance, especially for companies listed 
in the capital market and public companies. The implementation of Good Corporate 
Governance principles for public companies is shown through various regulations 
issued by the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) which when it was still called the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE), with the issuance of decision 315 / BEJ / 06/2000 on 
June 30, 2000, which contains all companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange to 
implement Good Corporate Governance. 
Claessens et al (2000) stated that companies in East Asia, such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore have share ownership structures that tend to be concentrated 
and the majority are owned by family companies. According to the Family Business 
Survey published by Price Watercooper House (PWC) 2014, there are more than 95% 
of companies in Indonesia dominated by family companies. Family companies 
provide a very large role in the economic field. Because the management of family 
companies is more monitored and controlled. However, families tend to take 
advantage of control over a decision. This control is in the form of placing family 





















families can exploit excessive wealth, conduct transactions with related parties or 
specifically give dividends. Families can also take action to maximize their personal 
utility so that the company's performance becomes worse than non-family companies. 
Based on the discussion on the factors that can minimize the expropriation, 
the researcher is interested in exploring multiple large institutional mechanism and 
the implementation of Corporate Governance considering the inconsistent research 
results on the effectiveness of governance on expropriation. According to Yeh, Shu, 
and Su (2012), Gao and Kling (2008), Hamid, Ting, and Kweh (2016), good 
governance practices can prevent tunneling activities. Furthermore, Lo, Wong, and 
Firth (2010) concluded that the quality of governance can limit the use of transfer 
price manipulations related to party sales transactions. Based on studies that show the 
existence of expropriation in family companies by looking at the dominated by family 
companies in Indonesia. The researcher wants to find out the mechanisms to reduce 
expropriations. For this reason, the researcher tries to add a moderating variable in the 
form of family ownership. The selection of family ownership as a moderating 
variable as well as the practice of expropriation is the Related Party Transaction 
through sales and purchase transactions. 
1.2 Research Problem 






















1. Does Multiple Large Institutional Shareholder affect the practice of 
expropriation in public companies in Indonesia? 
2. Does the implementation of  Corporate Governance affect the practice of 
expropriation in public companies in Indonesia? 
3. Does the family ownership has moderating influence of the Multiple Large 
Institutional Shareholder on the practice of expropriation in public companies 
in Indonesia? 
4. Does the family ownership has moderating influence of Corporate 
Governance on the practice of expropriation in public companies in 
Indonesia? 
1.3 Research Objective 
The objectives of the research of this study are as follow: 
1. To provide empirical evidence of the Multiple Large Institutional 
Shareholders influence the practice of expropriation in public companies in 
Indonesia. 
2. To provide empirical evidence of the implementation of Corporate 
Governance influences the practice of expropriation in public companies in 
Indonesia. 
3. To provide empirical evidence of the influence of the Multiple Large 





















in Indonesia which moderated by family ownership. 
4. To provide empirical evidence of the influence of Corporate Governance on 
the practice of expropriation in public companies in Indonesia which 
moderated family ownership. 
1.4 Research Contribution 
The result of this research is expected to contribute to:  
1. Theoretical benefit  
The result of this research is contributed to Agency theory type II. The theory 
discusses the conflict of interest between majority or controlling shareholders 
and minority or non-controlling shareholders which result in the expropriation 
of minority shareholders in many listed companies in Indonesia.  
2. Practical benefit  
The result of this research is expected to show that multiple large institutional 
shareholder and corporate governance will be effective to reduce the 
expropriation of minority shareholders in Indonesia. Moreover, the result of 
this research also expects that the company including the majority 
shareholders would be more aware in implementing good corporate 























2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is defined as contractual relations between shareholders as 
owners and management as agents (Jonson and Meckling, 1986). The 
shareholders delegate the management of the company to professional parties, in 
this case management. The management is considered to have the expertise and 
commitment to running the company's business. Based on the assumption that 
both parties are maximizing utilities, there will be reasons why management does 
not always act to maximize shareholder utility. The reason is quite clear because 
management prioritizes their own utilities. This gap of interests is called an 
agency problem or agency conflict. To avoid this agency conflict, shareholders 
need to provide incentives for management and issue monitoring costs. These 
emerging costs are called agency costs. Agency fees can also occur when 
management ignores shareholder utilities and makes decisions solely on the basis 
of management's interests. So that agency costs can be defined as costs incurred to 
maintain value as shareholders' property rights in order to reduce agency problems 
between stocks and management. 
Furthermore, Hendriksen (2002) said that in the agency theory contract 
agency is to perform certain tasks for the principal while the principal contract is 
to reward or compensate the agent. Eisenhardt (1989), as quoted by Yakob (2012) 






















1. Human is generally selfish. 
2. Human has limited thinking power regarding future perceptions. 
3. Human always avoids risks. 
In relation to agency relations, Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that if both 
parties, agents, and owners, try to maximize their utility then there is a possibility 
that agents will not always act in line with the interests of the owner. This is what 
drives the emergence of agency problems between agents and owners. This 
agency problem is a consequence of the separation of ownership functions with 
the management function in a company or called the separation of ownership and 
control. Agency problems that occur in this ownership structure are classified as 
first type agency problems. 
Gilson and Gordon (2003) classify agency conflicts into two major groups, 
namely agency conflicts caused by the separation between ownership and 
management (control). This agency conflict is referred to as the agency theory 
Type I. Agency theory Type I can be overcome with the form of concentration 
ownership, to create an alignment effect between shareholders and company 
managers. However, the solution to agency theory type 1 raises other agency 
conflicts, which later became known as other agency conflicts, which came to be 
known as agency theory type 2. Agency theory type 2 arise due to a gap of 
interests between concentrated holders (referred to as controlling shareholders) 






















In Indonesia, most companies have a concentrated ownership structure with 
the main controllers are families. This is consistent with the results of a survey by 
Claessens et al. (2000) which examined the separation of ownership in 9 countries 
in East Asia including Indonesia. Thus, companies in Indonesia, the dominant 
agency problem is the second type of agency problem. Because of the reasons 
above, this study focuses on two types of ownership concentration, one of which 
is the concentration of family ownership. 
Agency theory type 2 shows the existence of expropriation as a result of 
conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholders and non-controlling 
shareholders. Research conducted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et 
al. (2002) showed that agency conflicts that occur more frequently in countries 
other than the United States and Britain are expropriations by controlling 
shareholders to minority shareholders. A study by Claessens et al. (2002) and 
Attig et al. (2008) showed that controlling shareholders tend to expropriate 
minority shareholders when the difference between cash flow rights/control rights 
increases. Cash flow right is defined as the percentage of investment by 
shareholders (both individuals and institutions) in a company and directly reflects 
the right to cash flow distribution within the company. Control right is seen as 
something greater than cash flow rights, through pyramid structure and cross-
holding between companies. 
Control right is defined as the right to control the company by the 
shareholders even though the ownership of the shares in the company is very 





















shareholders to expropriate the company's assets for personal gain. The 
expropriation happened because the shareholders with a small share portion 
realized that he would not receive a large income through the company's cash 
distribution mechanism (for example dividends) so that he would use his control 
rights to get the maximum profit from the company. This can reduce the 
company's assets, reduce the value of the company which results in the reduction 
of the wealth of minority shareholders (entrenchment effect). Entrenchment effect 
is caused by the large number of controlling shareholders occurring in East Asian 
countries (Claessens, 2000). Managers at companies in East Asia usually have 
family relationships with the controlling shareholders. 
The basic findings on the concept of agency costs by Jensen and Meckling 
(1986) later became the root of subsequent studies that try to find ways to 
overcome agency costs within the company. Although it is impossible to 
eliminate, there are various mechanisms to reduce and minimize agency costs. 
The various mechanisms include modification of capital structure (equity and 
debt), modification of ownership structures (family and institutional ownership), 
dividend distribution, the existence of Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders 
(MLIS) and other mechanisms. 
2.2 Multiple Large Institutional Shareholder (MLIS) 
Studies related to Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders (MLIS) are 
closely related to the functions of supervision, escort, and control of the 





















between Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders (MLIS) and the value of the 
company and the relationship between MLIS and corporate governance. 
Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders (MLIS) is a group of the 
majority shareholders in a company (for example greater than 10% share 
ownership). Some of the majority shareholders can act as the controlling or 
majority shareholders or called Non-Controlling Large Shareholders (NCLS). 
Non-controlling large shareholders (NCLS) play an important role in corporate 
governance. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) research revealed the reason the 
founder / initial owner of the company to choose ownership structure with 
Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders (MLIS) that is to prevent a single 
controlling shareholder from unilateral actions and decisions that can harm other 
shareholders. This finding indicated that there is a purpose of avoiding agency 
conflicts by the founders of the company between the controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. However, compared to Western Europe, the MLIS has a 
more significant influence in East Asia, where agency conflicts on ownership 
structures are worse and aggravated by weak protection to minority shareholders. 
Regarding the relationship between Multiple Large Institutional 
Shareholders (MLIS) with company value, Pagano and Roell (1998) found that 
when there are two or more majority shareholders, it will lead to free riding. Even 
so, the presence of more than one majority shareholder shows an increase in the 
value of the company because it can reduce the excessive oversight efforts carried 
out by the largest shareholders if it is in the opposite condition. Company value is 





















(Cheng et al., 2012). This is in line with research findings by Maury and Pajuste 
(2005) which analyzed the influence of the identity of NCLS on its role in the 
company. Under certain conditions, NCLS has an affiliation with the controlling 
shareholders, and it turns out that this can have a significant effect on the 
relationship between NCLS and company value, as incentives to monitor or 
collude with major shareholders can be significantly affected by the identity of 
NCLS. 
NCLS can increase firm value by monitoring expropriation by controlling 
shareholders. It is in line with findings of Volpin (2002), Laeven and Levine 
(2008) and Attig et al., (2009) who found that NCLS is related to valuation 
premiums in the Italian, Western European economies, and East Asia. Edmans and 
Manso (2011) argued that competition among NCLS raises efforts to increase 
information in quality and quantity and is reflected in stock prices. With 
contributions from so many parties resulted in the threat of disciplinary exit and 
make managers improve their performance. 
Indonesia has a concentrated type of share ownership. Although 
concentrated or centralized at one party, share ownership can also be owned by 
other shareholders with a large portion or called Multiple large shareholders. The 
existence of Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders (MLIS) can provide 
benefits for the company, among others, can monitor the controlling shareholders 
and mitigate the emergence of agency problems. 
Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders (MLIS) is considered in line 





















supervise controlling shareholders which results in more accountable and 
impartial policies. MLIS plays an important role in corporate governance 
(Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). His research showed that the existence of 
MLIS prevents a single controlling shareholder from taking actions and making 
unilateral decisions that can harm the other party. Therefore, the existence of 
MLIS is able to prevent the expropriation carried out by the controlling 
shareholders of minority shareholders. 
Institutional ownership is generally able to reduce agency problems within 
the company. Institutional ownership can play its role as a corporate governance 
mechanism from external companies. According to Veronica and Bachtiar (2004), 
institutional ownership is one of the corporate governance mechanisms, in 
addition to the board of commissioners, the remuneration committee, and audit 
committee. Supervision carried out by institutional shareholders can influence the 
design of a professional and efficient compensation system, thereby encouraging 
management to achieve optimal performance and improve the mechanism of 
compensation systems that can be accepted by all groups (controlling shareholders 
and institutional shareholders) without harming other owner groups. 
In addition, agency problems caused by a single controlling shareholder 
can be reduced by the presence of MLIS and consequently the value of the 
company is increasing. This research is also supported by Volpin (2002), Laeven 
and Laevin, 2008, and Attig et al (2009) which showed that MLIS can reduce the 






















2.3 Corporate Governance 
According to the Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) 
(2001: 3), the notion of corporate governance is: "A set of rules governing the 
relationship between shareholders, management, creditors, government, 
employees and other internal and external stakeholders in relation to rights - their 
rights and obligations, or in other words a system that directs and controls the 
company. The purpose of corporate governance is to create value-added for all 
stakeholders. " 
 The agency problem in the relationship between the owner and the 
manager is how difficult it is for the owner to ensure that the invested funds are 
not taken over or invested on an unfavorable project that does not bring them 
return. Corporate governance is needed to reduce agency problems between 
owners and managers. Corporate governance explains the relationship between 
various participants in the company that determines the direction of the company's 
performance. 
Corporate governance which is a concept based on agency theory. It is 
expected to serve as a tool to give investor confidence that they will receive a 
return on the funds invested in a company. Corporate governance relates to how 
investors believe that managers will benefit investors, and will not steal or 
embezzle and invest in unprofitable projects related to the funds invested by 






















     The principles of Good Corporate Governance In Indonesia, the Code of 
Good Corporate Governance, are published by the National Corporate 
Governance Committee consisting of 5 principles that must be carried out by each 
company, namely: 
1. Transparency, to realize and maintain objectivity in business practices, 
companies must provide relevant and material information that is easily 
accessible and easily understood for stakeholders. Companies must have 
the initiative to disclose information not only those required by law and 
regulation but also other information that is considered important for 
shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders for decision making. 
2. Accountability, the company must be able to account for its performance 
fairly and transparently. So, companies must employ a method so that the 
company's interests are in line with the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Accountability is one of the prerequisites for obtaining 
sustainable performance. 
3. Responsibility, the company must follows the laws and rules and fulfill 
responsibilities to the community and the environment with the aim of 
maintaining long-term business continuity and being known as a good 
company. 
4. Independence, to support the implementation of the principles of good 
corporate governance, companies must be independently regulated by 





















and there is no intervention from other parties. 
5. Fairness, in carrying out its activities, the company must prioritize the 
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders based on the principle of 
fairness. The enforcement of the fairness principle requires the existence 
of laws that are clear, firm, consistent and can be enforced well and 
effectively. 
Conventional corporate governance mechanisms are considered not strong 
enough to overcome agency problems in Asia (Claessens and Fan 2003) so that 
other mechanism is needed to improve conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms. This study uses the governance scores developed by FCGI in the 
form of Corporate Governance Self-Assessment Checklist that measure five areas 
of corporate governance, namely shareholder rights, governance policies, 
governance practices, disclosure, and audit functions. 
1.1.1 2.3.1 The Implementation of Good Corporate Governance 
The successful implementation of good corporate governance has its own 
prerequisites. There are two factors that greatly affect the success of GCG 
implementation, including: 
1. External factors 
External factors are factors from outside of the company that 
greatly affect the successful implementation of GCG. Among of them: 
a. There is a good legal system so that it can guarantee the validity of 





















b. There is a support for the implementation of GCG from the public 
sector/government institutions. 
c. There are examples of the best practices of GCG benchmark that 
can become effective and professional GCG implementation 
standards.  
d. The establishment of a social value system that supports the 
implementation of GCG in the community. This is important 
because, through this system, it is expected that there will be active 
participation from various groups of society to support the 
application and socialization of GCG. 
e. Another important prerequisite for the successful implementation 
of GCG, especially in Indonesia, is the existence of an anti-
corruption spirit that develops in the political environment in 
which the company operates. In fact, it can be said that the 
improvement of the public environment greatly influences the 
quality and value of companies in the implementation of GCG. 
2. Internal factors 
The internal factors are the driving force of successful 
implementation of GCG practices that come from within the company, 
including: 
a. A corporate culture that supports the implementation of GCG 





















b. Various regulations and policies issued by the company referring to 
the application of the GCG values. 
c. Company risk management control is based on GCG standards. 
d. An effective audit system in the company to avoid any 
irregularities that might occur. 
The company has public information disclosure policy to disclose every 
move and step of the management so that the public can understand and follow 
every step of the development and dynamics of the company from time to time. 
2.4 Family Ownership  
The majority ownership by individuals with a significant portion, also by 
family members, makes the company classified as a family company. Previous 
studies proposed different definitions related to family ownership share. In a study 
conducted by La Portaet al. (1999), a family company is defined as a company 
with individual ownership of at least 20%. It is also stated that if there are 
shareholders with 20% share, both directly and indirectly, then the shareholder is 
referred as controlling shareholders. 
Family companies  defines as all individuals and companies whose 
ownership is recorded (5% ownership and above must be recorded), except public 
companies, BUMNs, financial institutions (for example investment institutions, 
insurance, pension funds, banks and cooperatives) and the public ( individuals 
whose ownership is not required to be recorded, namely ownership under 5%). 





















Villalonga and Amit (2006) stated that family companies are companies 
whose founders or family members, either biological or married, serve as 
management members or directors, or their owners are at least 5% of the total 
equity of the company individually or in groups. Family ownership will only give 
value to the company when the ownership is combined with excessive family 
control, such as pyramid ownership and cross-holdings. 
The family company as a form of concentrated ownership structure is 
considered to be the solution to the agency theory type 1 because family wealth is 
closely related to the wealth of the company so that the family element has a 
strong incentive to supervise, oversee and control the manager (alignment effect). 
However, as described in the previous section, agency theory type 2 will remain 
present in family companies in the form of collusion between controlling 
shareholders and company management. 
A family company is a company whose ownership structure is 
continuously focused on the family. Controlling family members usually hold top 
management positions and can exercise control over the board of commissioners  
which in turn can give them the opportunity to take over minority shareholders. 
Family ownership first criteria is that the founder or family holds at least 20% of 
the outstanding shares and is the largest shareholder. The second criterion is 
whether the CEO or chairman of the board of directors is from a family member. 
If the name of the board of directors and the board of commissioners tend to be 
the same within a few years and has shares in the ownership of the company, it is 





















and Reeb, 2003). 
In several other studies, family company is who owns 5% shares (La Porta 
et al., 1998; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Claessens et al., 2000). Andres (2008) 
classifies family companies as a company whose shares is at least 25% owned by 
a particular family or if it is less than 25%, a family member becomes the board of 
directors or board of commissioners. So basically, the experts define family 
companies using a certain percentage of ownership and representatives of family 
members in the company. The difference generally lies in the magnitude of the 
cut-off of ownership used. This research uses the criteria of family companies, 
namely the percentage of share owned by the family in the structure of the 
company's shares by calculating directly the total number of shares. 
2.5 Expropriation of Shareholders 
Expropriation is defined as the takeover of wealth owned by someone 
intended for public interest (Brisley et al., 2011). However, in its development, it 
is negatively connoted, namely as the acquisition of wealth owned by another 
party to maximize his personal interests. 
In general, an expropriation is an act of seizure carried out by the 
controlling shareholder (majority) against non-controlling shareholders (minority). 
Expropriation occurs because one of the parties has control rights over the assets 
of the company, which is relatively larger than the control rights held by other 
parties. 





















(tunneling) (Johnson et al., 2000). Tunneling can be defined as the transfer of 
company resources to majority shareholders that can be done through related party 
transactions. There are two forms of tunneling according to Johnson et al., (2000), 
first, controlling shareholders transfer company resources through self-dealing 
transactions. Second, controlling shareholders can increase the proportion of their 
shareholdings through dilutive share expenditures, slow acquisitions, or through 
other financial transactions that discriminate against minority shareholders. 
The existence of a concentrated ownership structure tends to lead to a shift 
in agency conflict, namely the conflict that occurs between principles with the 
agency referred to as the type of agency problem. Becoming a conflict between 
the controlling shareholders and the manager and non-controlling shareholders. 
The agency conflict shift is referred to as type II agency problem. The discussion 
in the agency relationship has an impact on the internal company, the director and 
controlling shareholders will position themselves in the use of their power to carry 
out transactions in the case of appropriation of wealth from external stakeholders 
(Ryngaert & Thomas, 2007). With the existence of such matters, minority 
shareholders are seen as something that is not important and not taken into 
account by the majority shareholders. 
Expropriation can be explained from the perspective of agency theory. 
Within the framework of agency theory, there are three kinds of relationships, 
namely 1) the relationship between shareholders and management, 2) the 
relationship between shareholders and creditors, and 3) the relationship between 





















human nature as the basis for the development of agency theory. The assumptions 
of human nature are among others 1) every individual in action aims to maximize 
personal interests (self-interest), 2) individuals have limited thinking about the 
perception of the future (bounded rationality) and 3) individuals tend to avoid risk 
(risk averse). 
2.6 Related Party Transactions (RPT) 
Related parties transaction are transactions carried out between a company 
and its insiders or affiliates (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007). Transactions 
between related parties are a potential mechanism for internal parties of 
companies to carry out expropriation of minority shareholders through unilateral 
decision making (self-dealing). Related parties transaction (RPT) can occur due to 
contracts between directors and majority shareholders or other companies that are 
still affiliated. So that the party has an influence on the transaction to maximize 
personal wealth. Related parties transaction are considered to be detrimental to 
minority shareholders. But not all RPTs indicate expropriation practices. For some 
parties, there are those who argue that RPT is an act that endangers minority 
shareholders, but for certain parties, the RPT provides several benefits (Ryngaert 
& Thomas, 2007). 
The contribution of this research includes empirically proving the factors 
that influence the practice of expropriation. Companies can make related parties 
transaction because the transaction can provide results to the company. One of the 





















related parties. Related party relationships can occur when a party binds another 
party, where the party has the ability to control the other party or have a 
significant influence on other parties in making decisions. However, transactions 
between related parties are seen as harmful to external shareholders. Employees, 
directors and large shareholders are well positioned to use their influence in 
conducting transactions that are expropriating wealth from external shareholders 
(Ryngaert, 2007). 
Related parties transaction are a potential mechanism for internal parties of 
the company to carry out expropriation of minority shareholders through self-
dealing. This transaction between related parties is considered to be detrimental to 
the minority shareholders of non-controlling shareholders. The transaction was 
carried out, among others, through the decision to buy assets above market prices 
and there was no strategic added value to the company's operations (E. A. Gordon 
& Henry, 2005). Thus, transactions between related parties can cause irregularities 
in the activities of companies that hamper efforts to maximize the welfare of non-
controlling shareholders. Related party transactions can cause irregularities in 
company activities so that it can hamper efforts to maximize the welfare of non-
controlling shareholders (Dyanty, Utama, Rossieta, & Veronica, 2012). Harmful 
related party transactions can be viewed in accordance with the conflict of interest 
hypothesis which is one of the conflicts of agency theory (E. A. Gordon & Henry, 
2005). In addition, inter-party transactions have two contradictory hypotheses, 
namely related party transactions as opportunistic transactions or as efficient 





















transaction, transactions between parties have a conflict of interest that is 
consistent with agency theory, as expressed by Berle and Means (1932) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Related party transactions can be used as a tool for 
expropriating company resources. On the other hand, related party transactions are 
seen as efficiency transactions, where this concept was developed by Coase 
(1937) and Williamson (1975) which states that related party transactions are not 
detrimental and can even benefit shareholders (Chang & Hong, 2000; Jian & 
Wong, 2010; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Stein, 1997). 
There are several related party transactions that lead to expropriation 
practices for example, asset acquisitions made by public companies from related 
parties, sale of assets from public companies to related parties, sale of equity by 
public companies to related parties, trade relations between public companies and 
related parties (for example sales transactions of goods and services, direct cash 
payments or debt guarantees) by public companies to related parties. In addition, 
there are transactions that do not lead to expropriation practices but only provide 
benefits for public companies. The transaction includes cash receipts by public 
companies (referred to as propping up) and transactions that occur between public 
companies and their subsidiaries. 
Research conducted by Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis (2006) and Cheung, 
Jing, Lu, Rau & Stouraitis (2009) also investigated expropriation practices 
through transactions with related parties. Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis (2006) 
investigated the types of transactions between related parties which indicated the 





















further research, Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau & Stouraitis (2009) investigated 
expropriation practices through tunneling to public companies in China. 
Tunneling is a condition when a company receives cash or loans from related 
parties or from a controlling shareholder. For example, if a company acquires 
assets, goods or services from a related party with a price below market price, 
then this transaction may indicate tunneling (Cheung, et al., 2009). The results of 
this study indicate that tunneling is more often done by public companies in China 
accompanied by minimization of information disclosure related to transactions 
between related parties. Tunneling is the transfer of assets and profits from 
subsidiaries for the benefit of the parent company or better with the aim of 
benefiting shareholders controller (Johnson, Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, & Shleifer, 
2000). 
2.6 Researcher Framework 
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of Multiple Large 
Institutional Shareholders (MLIS) on expropriation practices on public companies 
and the mechanism of corporate governance in these companies and to observe 
the moderating of these two variables on family ownership of expropriation. 
Based on the explanations above, the researcher develops a research framework in 

































    
1.1.2 2.6.1 Influence of Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders on 
Expropriation Practices 
Utama et al (2017) stated that employing MLIS in a company is necessary 
to support the implementation of good corporate governance so that the role of 
MLIS in mitigating agency problems can be more effective. Lin et al (2016) also 
suggested that MLIS plays an important role in supervising companies that have 
very severe agency problems. 
MLIS in this study is seen from the institutional ownership. The spread of 
the company's ownership structure can provide significant strength to the manager 
to maximize his personal interests and not for the benefit of the shareholders and 

















1. RPP (Purchase) 
2. RPS(Sales) 




























Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares by the government, 
financial institutions, legal entities, foreign institutions, and other institutions in a 
company. The institution intended is the owner of a public company in the form of 
an institution, not the owner in the name of a private individual (Sekaredi, 2011). 
Companies with large institutional ownership indicate their ability to monitor 
management because the greater the institutional ownership, the more efficient 
utilization of company assets and is expected to also act as a preventive measure 
against waste done by management. The higher institutional ownership will 
reduce the opportunistic behavior of managers who can reduce agency costs 
(Wahyudi and Pawestri, 2006). From the description above, the formulated 
hypotheses are: 
H1a : Multiple large institutional shareholder has a negative effect on RPT 
Purchase in public companies in Indonesia. 
H1b : Multiple large institutional shareholder has a negative effect on RPT 
Sales in public companies in Indonesia. 
1.1.3 2.6.2 The Influence of Corporate Governance on Expropriation 
Practices 
Indonesia and other Asian countries have a concentrated ownership 
structure. In countries with concentrated ownership, agency conflicts that occur 
are no longer between owners and managers, but between controlling shareholders 






















Using agency theory approach, corporate governance mechanisms are used 
to protect the interests of minority shareholders by preventing majority 
shareholders opportunistic actions including expropriation. The implementation of 
corporate governance as a strong governance mechanism is also expected to 
provide protection to investors and ensure a fair level of treatment for all 
shareholders so that the implementation of good corporate governance will be able 
to prevent expropriation practices by the controlling shareholders. Hamid et al., 
(2016) found that the mechanism of governance in the form of the number of 
independent directors on the audit committee and the separation of the position of 
CEO and chairman would reduce the rate of expropriation in Malaysia. Lo et al. 
(2010) also stated that the mechanism of corporate governance in the form of a 
high percentage of independent directors, the presence of different people in the 
position of CEO and president, and the presence of financial experts on the audit 
committee will reduce expropriation in the form of manipulation of transfer prices 
in the RPT. The formulated research hypothesis is: 
H2a : Corporate Governance has a negative effect on RPT Purchase in 
public companies in Indonesia. 
H2b : Corporate Governance has a negative effect on RPT Sales in public 
companies in Indonesia 
1.1.4 2.6.3 Family Ownership as Moderating Variable 
In this study, family ownership calculate as a percentage of family 





















group who are part of the board of directors or directors, as well as companies 
other than public (individuals or individuals whose ownership is not required to be 
recorded or less than 5%), public companies, and financial institutions (banks, 
mutual funds, insurance, investment companies, pension funds, cooperatives and 
others). This variable is obtained by adding up share ownership from the 
definition of the family that is included in the share capital section in the 
company's financial statements. 
Family companies are one of the concentrated forms of share ownership in 
developing countries. This condition is caused by, among other things, weak rules 
in the company environment. Companies that have controlling shareholdings by 
the family tend to make decisions that can benefit the family (Fama and Jensen, 
1983); Shleifer and Voshny, 1997, Faccio et al. 2001). Even though decisions 
made tend to be for the benefit of the family (private), companies with family 
ownership still pay attention to the company's performance to continue profitable. 
The existence of a family or party classified as a family company also contributes 
to economic growth in a country. 
On the other hand, family companies have unique characteristics. The 
characteristics of these family companies are that they can seek greater efficiency 
in operating costs, higher worker productivity, and greater investment efficiency 
(Muttakin et, al., 2015). Therefore, the investment efficiency company is greater 
(Muttakin et, al., 2015). On the other hand, public companies do not run 
effectively when against family ownership in the company. Lane et al., (2006) 





















This is because families want to avoid accountability and always maintain the 
confidentiality of the company so that independent commissioners find it difficult 
to make the best decisions in improving company performance. 
Leuang et al., (2014) argued that the concentration of family ownership 
can weaken the role of independent commissioners in family companies lower 
than non-family companies. Therefore the use of independent commissioners is 
less effective in supervising the performance of family companies compared to 
non-family companies. Non-family companies prioritize more intensive 
supervision from independent parties in producing the accuracy of financial 
information. In family companies, controlling family members may not want to 
share information and power between family members and independent 
commissioners (Westphal, 1999). 
Based on the explanation above, this study uses the percentage of total 
family ownership family companies as moderation. The formulated research 
hypothesis is: 
H3a : Family ownership weakens the negative effect of Multiple Large 
Institutional Shareholders to RPT Purchase in public companies in 
Indonesia. 
H3b : Family ownership weakens the negative effect of Multiple Large 
Institutional Shareholders to RPT Sales in public companies in 
Indonesia. 





















practice of expropriation is weakening if a company has family ownership 
compared to the non-family ownership company. 
H4a : Family ownership weakens the negative effect of the Corporate 
Governance to RPT Purchase in public companies in Indonesia. 
H4b : Family ownership weakens the negative effect of the Corporate 
Governance to RPT Sales in public companies in Indonesia. 
This means that the negative influence of the implementation of Corporate 
Governance on minimizing the practice of expansion is weakening if a company 






















3.1 Type of Research 
This research used quantitative method, to examine relationship among 
variables and determine cause and effect interactions between variables. Resource 
of data is secondary data. Secondary data is the historical data which is gathered 
and grouped by other parties and could be obtained from previous research, case 
studies, library records, online data, company websites, and the internet in general 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2014). Resource of data that is used in this research is 
secondary data from Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
3.2 Population and Sample 
 Population refers to the entire group of people, events, or things of interest 
that the researcher wishes to investigate and sample refers to the entire group of 
people, events, or things of interest that the researcher wishes to investigate 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2014). Population in this research are the company which 
were listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2016-2017. The year of research were 
chosen because it is the latest data that can be obtained in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. Therefore, the data is the most recent and up to date which is useful to 
reflect the information and condition of the sample’s companies. 
The sample of this research is collected using purposive sampling. 
Purposive sampling is a sampling method where the samples are chosen based on 




















the researcher are as follow: 
 1. Indonesian company must be listed in IDX in the period of 2016-2017. 
 2. Indonesian company conduct transactions of purchase and sales with 
related party. 
 3. Indonesian company that have institutional shareholder.   
 4. The financial statements are presented in Rupiah currency and must be 
available as well as audited by the independent auditor during the period 
The several sample criteria above are presented in table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1 
The Selection of Research Samples Results 
No Information Amount  
1 Total listed firms in IDX 2016-2017  534 
2 Companies other than trading and industry 
companies listed on the IDX 
323 
3 Financial statement using other currency than 
Rupiah 
28 
4 The company does not provide the data 
needed in the variables needed from the full 
year 
86 





















3.3 Data Collection Method 
 Resource of data is secondary data. Secondary data is the historical data 
which is gathered and grouped by other parties and could be obtained from 
previous research, case studies, library records, online data, company websites, 
and the internet in general (Sekaran & Bougie, 2014). Resource of data that is 
used in this research is secondary data from Indonesian Stock Exchange and 
picking from:  
1. Annual report in 2016-2017 from companies selected as sample 
 2. Company’s official website. 
3.4 Research Variables and Measurement 
3.4.1 Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is a variable that is influenced by an independent 
variable. The value of the dependent variable will change with the change of the 
independent variable. This study used the dependent variable, Expropriation. 
The dependent variable uses in the current study is expropriation referring 
to the misuse of one’s control powers by controlling shareholder to maximize their 
own welfare and extract wealth from minority shareholder. The proxy uses in this 
study is related party transaction of purchase and sales. This study replicated the 
research of Cheung et al. (2006) in identifying related party transactions which 




















transactions is available in the Financial Statements in the company's Annual 
Report. This research collected the amount or amount of each transaction and then 
summed it up by category. For the total value of sales, transactions were divided 
by the total sales of the company, the total purchase value was divided by the total 
purchase of the company. It was concluded that related party transactions in this 
study were classified into two groups, namely sales and purchase transactions 
between related parties. This can be described in the following formulas:  
RPP = RPT Purchase   RPS =  RPT Sales 
 Total Purchase   Total Sales 
 
3.4.2 Independent Variables 
Independent variables are variables that affect changes to the dependent 
variable. This study used 2 (two) independent variables, Multiple Large 
Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance. 
3.4.2.1 Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders (MLIS) 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares by non-individual 
investors consisting of company investors, mutual funds, pension funds, financial 
institutions, insurance, or other companies. Multiple large institutional shareholder 
measure by shares that owned by institution divided by total company shares 
(Juniarti and Sentosa, 2009:94). The formula obtained: 
 MLIS = Shares that owned by Institution 
Total Shares 
3.4.2.2 Corporate Governance (CG) 




















calculated using the guidelines developed by FCGI in the form of Corporate 
Governance Self-Assessment Checklist (see Appendix 2) because the guideline 
has a complete guide in assessing corporate governance which measures five 
fields of governance, namely:  
a. Shareholder rights (20%), 
b. Governance policy (15%), 
c. Governance practices (30%), 
d. Disclosure (20%), 
e. Audit function (15%). 
The assessment is done by giving a value 0 to 5 in the criteria in each 
category. Then, add the value of each category which will then be multiplied by 
the score of the category, and then add up all the measurement results. 
3.4.2.3  Family Ownership (FamOwn) 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) stated that family firms, as those in which the 
founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, 
director, or blockholder, either individually or as a group.  Family ownership is a 
variable used for the proxy of family companies. In this study, family ownership is 
the percentage of controlling share ownership by the family. Family Ownership is 
calculated from the total percentage of family ownership in the company. 
 FamOwn = Shares that owned by Family 





















3.5 Data Analysis Methods 
Data analysis methods used were descriptive statistical analysis, classical 
assumptions, and multiple linear regression analysis. This study used regression 
analysis techniques in the SPSS version software application. 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics in this study was to provide an overview or 
description of the distribution/dispersion of data seen from the mean value, 
standard deviation, maximum and minimum (Ghozali, 2006).  
3.5.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
he hypothesis in this study is tested by multiple regression. Multiple 
regression analysis is used to analyse the relation between two or more 
independent variables and one dependent variable. According to Ghozali (2013), 
the model for multiple regression in this study as follow: 
Model 1: 
RPP = α + β1MLIS + β2CG + ε2 .......……......................................................... (1) 
RPP = α + β1 MLIS + β2CG + β3MLIS*FamOwn + β4CG*FamOwn + ε2 ...... (2) 
Model 2: 
RPS = α + β1MLIS + β2CG + ε2……….…….................................................... (3) 






















RPP = Related Party Purchase 
RPS = Related Party Sales 
CG = Corporate Governance 
MLIS = Multi Large Institutional Shareholder 
FamOwn = Family Ownership 
α = constant 
ɛ = error 
3.5.2.1Coefficient of Determination  
The coefficient of determination (R-squared) measures the model’s ability to 
explain the variation of the dependent variable or how close the data are to the 
fitted regression line. The R-squared is always between 0 and 1. In general, the 
higher the R-squared or close to one means the independent variables provide 
almost all the necessary information to predict the variation of the dependent 
variable. While, the smaller of R-squared indicating the ability of the independent 
variables to explain the variation of dependent variable are very limited. 
3.5.2.2 F-Test  
The F-test is used to indicates whether there is independent variable that 
has significant effect on the dependent variable. The decision criteria are by 
comparing 33 the F-value from the calculation with the value of F according to 




















there is one independent variable that affects the dependent variable. 
3.5.3 Classic Assumption Test 
3.5.3.1 Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity test is used to measure the degree of association 
(cohesion) relationship / influence between independent variables in the 
regression model. Multicollinearity or the relationship between the independent 
variables can be determined by tolerance value and VIF (Variance Inflation 
Factor), where the tolerance value ≤ 0.10 and VIF ≥ 10 (Ghozali, 2013, p. 105).  
3.5.3.2 Heteroscedasticity test 
Heteroscedasticity test aims to ensure whether in a regression model 
occurs unequal variant of residual observations to other observations. If the 
residuals have the equal variance, called homoscedasticity, and if the variance is 
not equal, it is called heteroscedasticity. The regression equation was good if there 
is no heteroscedasticity indicated in this study. Glejser test is used to test the 
heteroscedasticity in this study, because it has more accurate value than scatterplot 
model. The Glejser test is performed by regressing the independent variable with 
its residual absolute value. If the value of significance between independent 
variables with absolute residual is more than 0.05 then the homoscedasticity is 
fulfilled (Ghozali,2013,p.142).  
3.5.3.3 Normality Test 
Normality test aims to test that in the regression model, or residual 
confounding variable is normally distributed. This is in line with the assumption 




















test and f test. If this assumption is violated, the statistical test to be invalid for a 
number of small samples. One way to test for normality is the statistical test, and 
this study uses the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. (Ghozali, 2013, p. 
164). 
3.5.4 Hypothesis Test  
The purpose of hypothesis testing is to answer the hypothesis that have 
been construct in chapter 2. These can be checked through statistical measurement 
called t-test. This research uses one tailed test so that the significance of the t-
value (sig. t) should be divided by 2 to get the p value. 
3.5.4.1 t-test 
The t-test is basically to check if each independent variable has a 
significant effect on the dependent variable by comparing the t-value and t-table at 
significant level α = 5%. The assessment is as follows: a. If t-value is > t-table or 
if sig.t is > α, it means that the independent variables significantly influence the 
dependent variable, H0 is accepted. b. If t –value is < t-table or if sig. t is < α, it 
means that the independent variable has no significant effect on the dependent 






















RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics Results 
 Descriptive statistics serves to describe the characteristics of the research 
variables consisting of expropriation practices, multiple large institutional 
shareholder, corporate governance, using family ownership as moderation. The 
data used in descriptive statistics are average values, maximum values, minimum 
values, and standard deviations. The process of descriptive statistics results are 
presented in Table 4.1 below: 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Research Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
MLIS* 97 0.02 0.99 0.69 0.22 
Corporate Governance 97 0.37 0.88 0.74 0.09 
Family Ownership 97 0.00 0.98 0.09 0.19 
Related Party Transaction 
(Purchase) 97 0.00 6.43 1.84 1.56 
Related Party Transaction (Sales) 97 0.00 6.57 1.63 1.63 
Source: Appendix 4 
*MLIS = Multiple Large Institutional Shareholder 
The result shows on Table 4.1 based on the number of  97 data samples 





















following will explain the results of the descriptive statistics of each variable in 
this study. Based on the table, the average of Multiple Large Institutional 
Shareholder is 69% with 0.22 for standard deviation. The Corporate Governance 
have an average 0f 74% with 0.09 standard deviation. The average of 
expropriation of Indonesian public companies proxied by related party transaction 
of purchase and sales are 1.84 and 1.63 with 1.56 and 1.63 standard deviation. The 
standard deviation of Multiple Large Institutional Shareholder, Corporate 
Governance, and Related Party Transaction (Purchase and Sales) are lower than 
the mean or the mean gap is low. Family ownership average is 9% with 0.19 
standard deviation. The standard deviation of Family Ownership is greater than 
the mean or the mean gap of  Family Ownership is high. Most of the data shows 
that mean is larger than standard deviation except Family Ownership. It is not a 
problem because number of data is larger enough (more than 30 data). The large 
data tend to be normally distributed. So, this does not cause econometric 
problems. 
4.2 Multiple Regression Analysis  
The hypothesis testing in this study used multiple regression. Multiple 
regression analysis is done to predict the relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the practice of 
expropriation proxied by related party sales transactions (RPT of Purchases and 
sales). The independent variables include multiple large institutional shareholders, 
governance, and family ownership as moderating variables. Multiple regression 





















Regression Equation (RPT Purchase) 
  Variable Coefficient t-value F-value R² 
Panel 1 (Constant) 6.762 6.52 23.99** 0.338 
 




Governace (CG) -3.447** -2.393     
Panel 2 (Constant) 6.922 6.636 12.921** 0.36 
 




Governace (CG) -4.258* -2.832 
  
 
MLISxFamOwn -4.583** -1.760 
    CGxFamOwn 4.481** 1.595     
**Significant at 0.01 level  *Significant at 0.05 level 
Source : Appendix 5 
MLIS   = Multiple Large Institutional Shareholder 
FamOwn  = Family Ownership 
The coefficient of determination is used to measure of how much the 
independent variable used in this research (Multiple Large Institutional 
Shareholder, Corporate Governance and Family Ownership as moderating 
variable) contributed or influenced on the dependent variable which is related 
party transaction of purchase.  Based on table 4.2, the coefficient of determination 
(R²) on panel 1 and panel 2 are 0,338 and 0,360 in which means the 33.8% and 
36% of the dependent variable related party transaction of purchase is influenced 
by the independent variables (Multiple Large Institutional Shareholder, Corporate 
Governance and Family Ownership as moderating variable). Meanwhile, the rest 
of  66.2% and 64% of the dependent variable (Related Party Transaction of 





















Based on the Table 4.2, the result of F-value are 23.990 on panel 1 and 
12.921 on panel 2 significant at 0.00 level. While the F-table is 3.090. Since F-
value is > F-table which is 23.990 > 3.090 on panel 1 and 12.921 > 3.090 on panel 
2 or the value of Sig. F (0.000) is < α (0.050). Thus, it can be concluded that at 
least there is one independent variable in the regression model that has significant 
effect on dependent variable (Related Party Transaction of Purchase). They are 
multiple large institutional shareholder, corporate governance and family 
ownership as moderating variable. 
Tabel 4.3 
Regresion Equation (RPT Sales) 
  Variable Coefficient t-value F-value R² 
Panel 1 (Constant) 6.915 6.2 19.782** 0.296 
 




Governace (CG) -4.273* -2.759     
Panel 2 (Constant) 7.016 6.163 9.804** 0.299 
 




Governace (CG) -4.485* -2.733 
  
 
MLISxFamOwn -0.971** -0.342 
    CGxFamOwn 0.487** 0.159     
**Significant at 0.01 level  *Significant at 0.05 level 
Source : Appendix 5 
MLIS   = Multiple Large Institutional Shareholder 
FamOwn  = Family Ownership 
The coefficient of determination (R²) on panel 1 and panel 2 are 0,296 and 




















party transaction of purchase is influenced by the independent variables (Multiple 
Large Intitutional Shareholder, Corporate Governance and Family Ownership as 
moderating variable). Meanwhile, the rest of  70.4% and 70.1% of the dependent 
variable (Related Party Transaction of Purchase) is influenced by others 
independent variable which is not discussed in this research. 
Based on the Table 4.3, the result of F-value are 19.782 on panel 1 and 
9.804 on panel 2 significant at 0.00 level. While the F-table is 3.090. Since F-
value is > F-table which is 19.782 > 3.090 on panel 1 and 9.804 > 3.090 on panel 
2 or the value of Sig. F (0.000) is < α (0.050). Thus, it can be concluded that at 
least there is one independent variable in the regression model that has significant 
effect on dependent variable (Related Party Transaction of Purchase). They are 
multiple large institutional shareholder, corporate governance and family 
ownership as moderating variable. 
4.3 Classic Assumption 
 The result of multiple regression is fit to the model because there are no 
violation of classical assumptions required such as normality of error, 
multicolinearity, heterocedastisity. Thus, the regression results are appropriate of 
being used to test the research hypothesis.  
4.3.1 Normality Test 
  The normality test is used to check if the residuals or errors are normally 
distributed. Typically, to assess this assumption using the normal probability plot 




















residuals have normal distribution from the normal probability plot and histogram. 
Thus, the normality assumption is fulfilled and fit the model. 
4.3.2 Multicolinearity Test  
The multicollinearity test shows that there is no correlation among 
independent variables. It is proven from Tolerance value which is higher than 0.10 
and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) which is lower than 10. Thus, it can be 
concluded that non-multicollinearity assumptions are fulfilled. 
Tabel 4.4 
Result of Multicolinearity Test 




MLIS  0.918 1.090  
CG  0.918 1.090 
Panel 2 
MLIS  0.684 1.462  
CG  0.832 1.202 
MLISxFamOwn  0.110 9.055  
CGxFamOwn  0.115 8.714 
    Source: Appendix 6 

























Result of Multicolinearity Test 




MLIS  0.918 1.090  
CG  0.918 1.090 
Panel 2 
MLIS  0.684 1.462  
CG  0.832 1.202 
MLISxFamOwn  0.110 9.055  
CGxFamOwn  0.115 8.714 
     Source: Appendix 6 
       Data for Related Party Transaction of Sales 
4.3.3 Heteroscedasticity Test  
Heteroscedasticity test is done using the plot graphic test by checking 
whether there is a particular pattern in scatterplot graph between variance X and Y 
or not. If the dots are spread randomly around 0 number on axis Y in the 
scatterplot graph, it can be concluded that there is no heteroscedasticity and vice 
versa. The result of heteroscedasticity test can be seen on appendix 4. Based on 
the appendix 6, the scatterplot diagram shows the dots are spread randomly and 
doesn’t form a particular pattern. Thus, it can be concluded that the regression 
model is free from heteroscedasticity. 
4.4 Hypothesis Testing 




















been construct in chapter 2. These can be checked through statistical measurement 
called t-test. This research used one tailed test so that the significance of the t-
value (sig.) should be divided by 2 to get the p value.  
Based on table 4.2, for panel 1 the t-value of multiple large shareholder is 
5.539. While t-table is 1.645. Since t-value is > t-table which is 5.539 > 1.645 or p 
value is 0,000 from sig (0,000/2) < α = 0.05, it means that the influence of 
multiple large shareholder on related party transaction of purchase is significant. 
The t-value of corporate governance is 2.393. Since t-value is > t-table which is 
2.393 > 1.645, or p value is 0,000 from sig. t (0,000/2) < α = 0.05 meaning that 
the influence of corporate governance on related party transaction of purchase is 
significant.  
On the panel 2, the t-value of  multiple large shareholder is 3.928. While t-
table is 1.645. Since t-value is > t-table which is 3.928 > 1.645 or p value is 0,000 
from sig.(0.000/2) < α = 0.05, it means that the influence of multiple large 
shareholder on related party transaction of purchase is significant. The t-value of 
corporate governance is 2.832. Since t-value is > t-table which is 2.832 > 1.645, 
or p value is 0.003 from sig.(0.006/2) < α = 0.05 meaning that the influence of 
corporate governance on related party transaction of purchase is significant. The t-
value of moderating variable MLISxFamOWn is 1.760. Since t-value > t-table 
which is 1.760 > 1.645 or p value is 0.041 from sig. (0.082/2) > α =0.05 meaning 
that the influence of moderating variable is significant. The t-value of moderating 
variable CGxFamOWn is -1.595. Since t-value < t-table which is -1.595 < 1.645 




















moderating variable is not significant. 
From result above, we know that the independent variable which are 
multiple large institutional shareholder and corporate governance has a significant 
effect on related party transaction of purchase. Thus, the hypothesis 1a and 2a 
which states that multiple large institutional shareholder and corporate governance 
affects can reduce the expropriation practices is accepted. For moderating 
variable, the result showed that theres significant effect between MLISxFamOwn 
so hypothesis 3a is accepted and for CGxFamOwn theres no significant effect to 
related party transaction of purchase so the  hypothesis 4a are rejected. 
Based on table 4.3, for panel 1 the t-value of multiple large shareholder is 
4.623. While t-table is 1.645. ince t-value is > t-table which is 4.623 > 1.645 or p 
value is 0,000 from sig.(0,000/2) < α = 0.05, it means that the influence of 
multiple large shareholder on related party transaction of purchase is significant. 
The t-value of corporate governance is 2.759. Since t-value is > t-table which is 
2.759 > 1.645, or p value is 0,003 from sig.(0,007/2) < α = 0.05 meaning that the 
influence of corporate governance on related party transaction of purchase is 
significant.  
On the panel 2, the t-value of  multiple large shareholder is 3.794. While t-
table is 1.645. Since t-value is > t-table which is 3.794 > 1.645 or p value is 0,000 
from sig.(0.000/2) < α = 0.05, it means that the influence of multiple large 
shareholder on related party transaction of purchase is significant. The t-value of 
corporate governance is 2.733. Since t-value is > t-table which is 2.733 > 1.645, 




















corporate governance on related party transaction of purchase is significant. The t-
value of moderating variable MLISxFamOWn is 0.342. Since t-value < t-table 
which is 0.342 < 1.645 or p value is 0.366 from sig.(0.733/2) > α =0.05 meaning 
that the influence of moderating variable is not significant. The t-value of 
moderating variable CGxFamOWn is -0.159. Since t-value < t-table which is  
-0.595 < 1.645 or p value is 0.437 from sig.(0.874/2) > α =0.05 meaning that the 
influence of moderating variable is not significant. 
From result above, we know that the independent variable which are 
multiple large institutional shareholder and corporate governance has a significant 
effect on related party transaction of purchase. Thus, the hypothesis 1b and 2b 
which states that multiple large institutional shareholder and corporate governance 
affects can reduce the expropriation practices is accepted. For moderating 
variable, the result showed that theres no significant effect between 
MLISxFamOwn and CGxFamOwn to related party transaction of purchase so the  




















4.5 Research Discussion  
4.5.1 The Influence of Multiple Large Institutional Shareholders on 
Expropriation Practices 
 Based on the results of the multiple large institutional shareholders' 
concentration variables testing on the practice of expropriation proxied through 
purchase and sales transactions between related parties, it can be seen that 
multiple large institutional shareholder has a negative effect on both purchase and  
sales transactions between related parties. The results of this study indicate that 
the greater the concentration of multiple large institutional shareholders can 
control the practice of expropriation. Therefore, the first hypothesis which states 
that multiple large institutional shareholders have a negative influence on RPT 
Purchase transactions and Sales in public companies in Indonesia is accepted. 
The results of this study support previous research (Luo and Jackson, 
2012; Qian et al., 2011; Moscariello, 2013) which argued that institutional 
shareholders tend to behave actively in voting compared to other shareholders, 
even though they do not have sufficient strength in voting rights. The results of 
this study suggest the importance of institutional shareholders other than 
controllers to control controlling shareholders against expropriation practices. 
Distribution of shares between outside shareholders, namely institutional investors 
can reduce agency problems. The existence of institutional ownership such as 
insurance companies, investment companies and ownership by other institutions 




















Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that the greater the level of share 
ownership by an institution, the more effective control mechanism will be on 
management performance. Institutions have the resources, ability and opportunity 
to monitor and discipline managers to be more focused on the value of the 
company.  Multiple large institutional shareholders have an important meaning in 
the monitoring mechanism because ownership of institutions will encourage more 
optimal supervision. Monitoring by institutional shareholders as supervisory 
agents can be effective because of their substantial investment in the capital 
market. 
Multiple large institutional shareholders have a very important role in 
minimizing agency conflicts that occur not only between managers and 
shareholders (Type I) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but also between majority and 
minority shareholders (Type II). The existence of institutional investors is 
considered capable of being an effective monitoring mechanism in every decision 
taken by the manager. This is because institutional investors are involved in 
strategic decision making so that it is not easy to trust decisions in related loan 
activities. 
4.2.2 The Influence Corporate Governance on Expropriation Practices 
 The hypothesis two states that corporate governance negatively affects 
expropriation practices. The test results show that the second hypothesis is 
accepted. The results of this study support previous research conducted by Hamid, 
et al. (2016), Lo, et al. (2010), and Yeh, et al. (2012) found that corporate  




















The agency theory type 2  that occurs between the controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders which is illustrated through related party sales transactions 
illustrating the potential for transfer price manipulation between related parties as 
one of the methods of expropriation practice. In overcoming agency problems, 
companies implement good corporate governance mechanisms that will reduce the 
potential for expropriation practices through the sale of related parties. 
The ability of corporate governance in reducing expropriation practices is 
based on the implementation of corporate governance must pay attention to the 
rights and interests of all stakeholders so as to ensure fair treatment for all 
stakeholders and reduce the risk of agency problems. 
Thus, the results of this study are able to confirm the application of agency 
theory, especially related to the use of corporate governance mechanisms as an 
effort to protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders over opportunistic 
actions such as expropriation by the controlling shareholders. 
  In addition, the results of this study is supported by Claessens and Fan 
(2003) who stated that conventional corporate governance mechanisms are 
considered not strong enough to overcome agency in Asia so that other 
mechanisms are needed that can improve the conventional corporate governance 
mechanism in this study using corporate governance scores. The use of corporate  
governance scores as a proxy for corporate governance mechanisms in this study 
can also be used as a reference for companies to be able to implement better 
corporate governance practices in each of their elements as an effort to ensure the 




















to gain public trust. 
4.2.3 The Influence of multiple large institutional shareholder On 
expropriation practices moderating by family ownership 
 Based on the results of the regression, moderating family ownership has a 
significant negative effect on expropriation practices, it shows that family 
ownership weakens MLIS negative influence and governance on expropriation 
practices. Companies with controlling shares held by the majority of families, 
families will always interfere in the management of the company and the family 
will also be in the top management position which will supervise directly. 
In family companies, the family usually does not want to share information about 
the company to an independent party and the implementation of a corporate 
governance is very low. According to Maury (2006), a family-controlled company 
plays an important role in controlling the company. Therefore, the role of MLIS is 
very weak in family companies, where the family is the controlling shareholder 
and has the power to determine company policy. This led to agency problem II 























 This study aims to empirically examine the effect of the Multiple Large 
Institutional Shareholders, Corporate Governance and  Family Ownership as 
moderating variable on expropriation practices in public companies in Indonesia. 
Expropriation practices are proxied by related party purchase and sales 
transactions. The sample used is a company listed on the IDX for two consecutive 
years from 2016-2017. 
The findings of this study revealed that expropriation through RPT 
purchase and sales could be minimized by multiple large institutional shareholder 
and corporate governance. This implied that the existence of institutional investors 
is considered capable of being an effective monitoring mechanism in every 
decision taken by the manager. This because institutional investors are involved in 
strategic decision making. The results of the corporate governance research 
provide empirical evidence that expropriation practices can be minimized by the 
application of good corporate governance. Companies that implement good 
corporate governance are certainly able to provide better protection for 
shareholders. The results of research family ownership as a moderating variable 
indicate that the existence of controlling shareholders by the family can weakens 
the negative influence between MLIS and governance on expropriation practices. 





















practices is higher in non-family companies compared to family companies. 
5.2 Research Limitations 
This research still has some limitations. Firstly, the expropriation practice 
only uses measurements of related party purchase and  sales transactions, where 
there are still various ways of measuring that cannot be done. Secondly, corporate 
governance disclosures in the annual reports carried out by the company do not 
reveal details of their corporate governance practices. This makes the assessment 
of governance to be less optimal. 
5.3 Suggestions 
Based on the limitations of the research results above, further researchers 
should consider other measures of expropriation in order to enrich research using 
measurements of other variables. For further researchers, it is also advisable to 
consider the addition of other data sources other than the annual report, by looking 
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Appendix 1. List of Samples 
No Kode  Nama Perusahaan 
1 ACES PT. Ace Hardware Indonesia. Tbk 
2 AGII PT Aneka Gas Industri Tbk. 
3 AISA PT. Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk 
4 AKPI Argha Karya Prima Ind. Tbk 
5 AKRA AKR Corporindo Tbk 
6 ALMI Alumindo Light Metal Industry Tbk 
7 ALTO Tri Banyan Tirta Tbk 
8 AMFG Asahimas Flat Glass Tbk 
9 AMRT PT. Ssumber Alfaria Trijaya Tbk 
10 APLI PT Asiaplast Industries Ybk 
11 ARGO PT Argo Pantes Tbk 
12 ARNA Arwana Citra Mulia Tbk 
13 ASII Astra International Tbk 
14 AUTO Astra Auto Part Tbk 
15 BATA Sepatu Bata Tbk 
16 BELL PT Trisula Textile Industries Tbk 
17 BOLT PT Garuda Metalindo Tbk 
18 BRNA PT Berlina Tbk 
19 CARS PT Industri Dan Perdgangan Bintraco Dharma 
Tbk 
20 CEKA Cahaya Kalbar Tbk 
21 CLEO PT Sariguna Primatirta Tbk 
22 CPIN Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk 
23 CSAP Catur Sentosa Adiprana Tbk 
24 DAYA PT Duta Intidaya Tbk 
25 DLTA Delta Djakarta Tbk 
26 DVLA Darya Varia Laboratoria Tbk 
27 ECII PT Electronic City Indonesia Tbk 
28 EKAD PT. Ekadharma International Tbk. 
29 EPMT PT Enseval Putera Megatrading Tbk 
30 ERAA PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk 
31 GDST Gunawan Dianjaya Steel Tbk 
32 GGRM PT Gudang Garam Tbk 
33 GJTL PT Gajah Tunggal Tbk 
34 GLOB PT Global Teleshop Tbk 
35 HERO PT Hero Supermarket Tbk 
36 HMSP Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk 




















38 IKBI PT Sumi Indo Kabel Tbk 
39 IMAS Indomobil Sukses Intenational Tbk 
40 IMPC PT Impack Pratama Industri Tbk 
41 INAF Indofarma Tbk 
42 INAI Indal Alumunium Industry Tbk 
43 INCI Intanwijaya Internasional Tbk 
44 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 
45 INTA Intraco Penta Tbk 
46 INTP Indocement Tunggal Prakasa Tbk 
47 ISSP PT Steel Pipe Industry of Indonesia. Tbk 
48 JECC PT Jembo Cable Company Tbk 
49 JPFA PT Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk 
50 KAEF Kimia Farma Tbk 
51 KBLI PT KMI Wire and Cable Tbk 
52 KBLM PT Kabelindo Murni Tbk. 
53 KINO PT Kino Indonesia Tbk 
54 KLBF Kalbe Farma Tbk 
55 KOIN PT Kokoh Inti Arebama Tbk 
56 LION Lion Metal Works Tbk 
57 LMSH Lionmesh Prima Tbk 
58 LPPF PT Matahari Department Store Tbk 
59 LTLS PT Lautan Luas Tbk 
60 MAIN PT Malindo Feedmill Tbk 
61 MAPI Mitra adiperkasa Tbk 
62 MBTO Martina Berto Tbk 
63 MCAS M Cash Integrasi PT 
64 MDKI PT Emdeki Utama, Tbk 
65 MERK Merck Tbk 
66 MICE Multi Indocitra Tbk 
67 MIDI Midi Utama Indonesia Tbk 
68 MKNT PT Mitra Komunikasi Nusantara Tbk. 
69 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk 
70 MLIA PT Mulia Industrindo, Tbk. 
71 MPPA PT Matahari Putra Prima Tbk 
72 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk 
73 MYTX PT Asia Pacific Investama Tbk 
74 PICO PT Pelangi Indah Canindo Tbk 
75 PYFA PT Pyridam Farma Tbk 
76 RICY Ricky Putra Globalindo Tbk 
77 RMBA Bentoel International Tbk 
78 ROTI Nippon Indosari Corporindo Tbk 
79 SCCO Supreme Cable Manufacturing and 
Commerce Tbk 





















81 SIPD Sierad Produce Tbk 
82 SKBM Sekar Bumi Tbk 
83 SMBR Semen Baturaja Persero Tbk 
84 SMCB Holcim Indonesia Tbk 
85 SMGR Semen Indonesia Tbk 
86 SMSM Selamat Sempurna Tbk 
87 SONA PT Sona Topas Tourism Industry Tbk 
88 SPMA PT Suparma Tbk 
89 SRSN Indo Acitama Tbk 
90 TALF PT Tunas Alfin Tbk 
91 TCID Mandom Indonesia Tbk 
92 TELE PT Tiphone Mobile Indonesia Tbk 
93 TGKA PT Tigaraksa Satria Tbk 
94 TOTO Surya Toto Indonesia Tbk 
95 TSPC Tempo Scan Pasific Tbk 
96 TURI PT Tunas Ridean Tbk 












































Appendix 2. Corporate Governance Self Assessment Checklist 
No Item 
1 Rights of Shareholders 
 1.1 Timeliness of the GMS 
1.2 Time notification of the GMS 
1.3 Voting rights at the GMS 
1.4 Implementationof extraordinary GMS  
1.5 Options at the GMS 
1.6 Financial information reliability 
1.7 Accuracy in delivering financial information 
1.8 Financial information comparison 
1.9 Non-financial information reliability 
1.10 Accuracy in the delivery of non-financial information 
1.11 Non-financial information significance 
1.12 Openness of the GMS 
1.13 Rights at the annual GMS 
1.14 Appointment of directors and commissioners 
1.15 The performance of directors and commissioners Assessment 
1.16 Compensation of directors and commissioners 
1.17 Appointment of external auditors 
 
2 Corporate Governance Policy 
 2.1 Determination of the duties of commissioners and directors 
2.2 Commitment to information disclosure 
2.3 Availability of information for investors 
2.4 The responsibility of the commissioner 
2.5 Compliance officer tools 




















2.7 Code of ethics for employees 
2.8 Shareholders' code of ethics 
2.9 Code of ethics for relationships with third parties 
2.10 Commitment to corporate governance 
2.11 Confidentiality of company information 
2.12 Confidentiality of employee information 
2.13 Legal and statutory compliance 
2.14 Resoluteness in implementing the company's code of ethics 
3 Corporate Governance Practices 
 Corporate Governance Practices 
3.1 Meeting of directors and commissioners 
3.2 Company business strategy 
3.3 Number of directors 
3.4 Number of commissioners 
3.5 Composition of directors and commissioners 
3.6 Conflict of directors' interests 
3.7 Meeting of directors 
3.8 Meeting of commissioners 
3.9 Conflict of interest in the company 
3.10 List of management shareholdings 
3.11 List of shareholdings in the family management 
3.12 Internal company policies 
3.13 Audit Committee 
3.14 Compensation Committee 
3.15 Nomination Committee 
3.16 Compliance Committee 




















3.18 Executive Committee 
3.19 Insurance Committee 
3.20 Board of Directors rating system 
3.21 Commissioner rating system 
3.22 Board of Directors assessment intensity 
3.23 Intensity of commissioner ratings 
3.24 Change in members of the board of directors 
3.25 Change in members of commissioners 
3.26 The appointing process of directors 
3.27 The appointing process of commissioners 
3.28 Candidates for appointing directors 
3.29 Candidates for appointing commissioners 
3.30 Compensation of directors' salaries 
3.31 Compensation of directors’bonus 
3.32 Stock options compensation for directors 
3.33 Commissioner salary compensation 
3.34 Compensation of bonus commissioners 
3.35 Stock options compensation for commissioners 
3.36 Duties and responsibilities disclosure 
3.37 Board of Directors meeting agenda 
3.38 Commissioner meeting agenda 
3.39 News of the meeting 
3.40 Supervision of directors 
3.41 Supervision of commissioners 
3.42 Supervision of company performance 
3.43 Company vision and mission 




















3.45 Intensity of training for directors and commissioners 
4 Disclosures 
 4.1 Availability of non-financial information 
4.2 Availability of financial information 
4.3 Production of financial information 
4.4 Intensity of delivering performance information 
4.5 Financial and non-financial information at the GMS 
4.6 Risk management system 
4.7 Business objectives and strategies 
4.8 Cross ownership and cross debt guarantees 
4.9 Assessment of business climate and risks 
4.10 List of directors and commissioners 
4.11 Value of compensation for directors and commissioners 
4.12 Other duties of commissioners 
4.13 Corporate governance practices 
4.14 Claims of court cases 
4.15 Disclosure of transactions with related parties 
4.16 Potential conflicts of interest 
4.17 Ownership of affiliated companies 
4.18 Disclosure of the company's ownership structure 
5 Audit 
 5.1 Internal audit quality 
5.2 Audit committee quality 
5.3 External audit quality 
5.4 Number of audit committees 
5.5 Members of the independent audit committee 




















5.7 Audit committee report 



































0.495318956 0.794366 0.000005 10.545 0.845 
0.659488831 0.794195 0.050676 90.93 8.025 
0.886517038 0.847667 0 13.98 0.575 




















0.787775096 0.880483 0 2.045 0.045 
0.764841828 0.764631 0 2.765 13.005 
0.869458083 0.660667 0 47.69 1.375 
0.910406794 0.7037 0 2.505 37.5 
0.525407772 0.817134 0.009435 0.96 0.13 
0.56112086 0.83008 0.254249 1.26 0 
0.547594011 0.777883 0 1.415 3.485 
0.139727528 0.834698 0.373224 0 90.485 
0.501148083 0.860243 0 40.78 7.555 
0.799999987 0.864073 0 25.055 34.825 
0.916553269 0.7357 0 35.495 1.24 
0.7904 0.837234 0 2.36 9.925 
0.48 0.818705 0.186667 14.64 4.015 
0.722458332 0.794896 0.073493 0 0.350317756 
0.651742263 0.686652 0 0 13.215 
0.8702 0.7037 0 38.745 66.51 
0.795454545 0.805771 0 25.2005 61.446 
0.776723926 0.7557 0.207192 5.03 0.51 
0.773308573 0.797285 0.036427 20.06 0.225 
0.978130619 0.764203 0 2.43 0 
0.906986594 0.7019 0 4.65 0.055 
0.932171288 0.663 0 0.29 17.7705 
0.700872181 0.783141 0 1.885 0 
0.785749286 0.764332 0 1.36 0.1 
0.930103236 0.74435 0 65.855 4.825 
0.70718142 0.764121 0.001379 0.195 0 
0.107166445 0.789175 0.480235 3.48 6.095 
0.9515 0.799962 0.0067 1.895 0 
0.81967943 0.771886 0 7.575 19.6 
0.620909867 0.768293 0.10313 32.92 0.175 
0.993498847 0.771894 0 0.815 0 
0.8630406 0.5223 0.925 1.275 0.545 
0.805329454 0.5041 0.333644 29.635 76.84 
0.460982843 0.789007 0.0005 77 72.335 
0.84005 0.6506 0 59.845 4.955 
0.833601216 0.770413 0.060578 0 8.415 
0.874175793 0.8403 0 0.197692356 0.007939394 
0.672667298 0.4164 0.107212 4.67 1.25 
0.021536626 0.668654 0.488725 0 34.815 
0.500670833 0.5811 0.000157 6.035 10.21 




















0.753889358 0.7557 0 0 0.2688 
0.568454068 0.800287 0 0 0 
0.3758 0.775438 0.5257 28.245 20.75 
0.629772307 0.770639 0.012968 13.27 2.035 
0.109902619 0.8556 0 1.005 4.265 
0.567930478 0.758238 0 0.34 0.007545128 
0.81982317 0.768088 0.089286 85.525 27.375 
0.878198116 0.72495 0.105693 99.035 0 
0.567494946 0.8556 0 0.52 0.94 
0.906195818 0.789412 0 99.39 0.5515 
0.288488157 0.3754 0.001245 0.275 29.19 
0.32215625 0.7557 0.162594 0.0455 0.095 
0.17477941 0.775121 3.43E-06 5.46 0 
0.53745641 0.78678 0.024533 0.675 8.065 
0.574838157 0.796521 0 8.06 5.095 
0.51 0.797756 0 0 0.5 
0.998782055 0.5084 0.986304 11.195 85.4 
0.86125812 0.76738 0.105 22.48 17.1 
0.623310665 0.791629 0.070988 4.565 1.945 
0.932620424 0.6479 0 53.66 8.285 
0.44981582 0.778627 0 79.7 6.4 
0.917870452 0.775166 0.234572 17.93 0.175 
0.743049206 0.797223 0 36.94 15.88 
0.915027613 0.752977 0 5.015 0.455 
0.836821933 0.779523 0 7.1 0.525 
0.932400728 0.767221 0 0.175 149.94 
0.772116391 0.5789 0.252199 8.275 66.905 
0.836878132 0.744732 0 620.7985 714.337 
0.94055 0.763224 0 44.09 50.52 
0.53846149 0.737441 0.230769 0 0 
0.480410142 0.4405 0.111626 25.05 6.815 
0.924771622 0.7035 0 13.985 3.94 
0.70282648 0.7286 0 22.46 41.205 
0.71151484 0.6576 0.047813 0 64.275 
0.749981249 0.7338 0.405 11.655 0.04 
0.953534659 0.7774 0.847322 0 0.1212 
0.827938968 0.824926 0 0.03 13.225 
0.777859088 0.7743 0 31.5 0.54 
0.970457504 0.5252 0 0.1 8.5 
0.982667683 0.6246 0 1.03 13.27 




















0.79698279 0.75477 0.111602 0.458650459 0 
0.480740027 0.78103 0.353831 0 0.075 
0.549112827 0.731 0.19278 0 0.6566 
0.994297251 0.744557 0 3.615 0.13 
0.85441714 0.7316 0 9.49 88.34 
0.501737056 0.789336 0.255009 2.725 0 
0.928361383 0.742412 0 5.408 0 
0.5448 0.7208 0 12.075 92.85 
0.7867 0.7079 0 0.27 0.02 
0.443729211 0.742834 0.428107 85.25 0 
























1 2 3 4 5 Total CG 
0.181176 0.139286 0.194043 0.171111 0.10875 0.794366 
0.181176 0.128571 0.206809 0.168889 0.10875 0.794195 
0.183529 0.139286 0.219574 0.177778 0.1275 0.847667 
0.148235 0.132857 0.220851 0.173333 0.12 0.795277 
0.178824 0.145714 0.238723 0.182222 0.135 0.880483 
0.183529 0.132857 0.215745 0.1125 0.12 0.764631 
0.141176 0.094 0.190213 0.137778 0.0975 0.660667 




















0.178824 0.137143 0.209362 0.175556 0.11625 0.817134 
0.183529 0.132857 0.210638 0.175556 0.1275 0.83008 
0.164706 0.124286 0.206809 0.173333 0.10875 0.777883 
0.174118 0.139286 0.222128 0.186667 0.1125 0.834698 
0.190588 0.139286 0.231064 0.175556 0.12375 0.860243 
0.190588 0.139286 0.234894 0.175556 0.12375 0.864073 
0.1341 0.1179 0.2438 0.1311 0.1088 0.7357 
0.181176 0.132857 0.233617 0.173333 0.11625 0.837234 
0.183529 0.126429 0.213191 0.175556 0.12 0.818705 
0.183529 0.124286 0.213191 0.168889 0.105 0.794896 
0.181176 0.010519 0.197872 0.173333 0.12375 0.686652 
0.1859 0.0964 0.1672 0.1267 0.1275 0.7037 
0.178824 0.132857 0.202979 0.171111 0.12 0.805771 
0.1765 0.1179 0.1736 0.1489 0.1388 0.7557 
0.181176 0.124286 0.220851 0.162222 0.10875 0.797285 
0.167059 0.130714 0.195319 0.151111 0.12 0.764203 
0.1576 0.1071 0.1711 0.1311 0.135 0.7019 
0.1812 0.0536 0.1391 0.1578 0.1313 0.663 
0.185882 0.126429 0.213191 0.148889 0.10875 0.783141 
0.152941 0.130714 0.199149 0.157778 0.12375 0.764332 
0.183529 0.115714 0.185106 0.14 0.12 0.74435 
0.171765 0.124286 0.194043 0.157778 0.11625 0.764121 
0.178824 0.135 0.190213 0.168889 0.11625 0.789175 
0.169412 0.139286 0.194043 0.162222 0.135 0.799962 
0.162353 0.132857 0.200426 0.16 0.11625 0.771886 
0.162353 0.135 0.185106 0.173333 0.1125 0.768293 
0.167059 0.137143 0.182553 0.168889 0.11625 0.771894 
0.1341 0.0321 0.1162 0.1311 0.1088 0.5223 
0.0941 0.0643 0.1047 0.1022 0.1388 0.5041 
0.157647 0.137143 0.215745 0.162222 0.11625 0.789007 
0.1647 0.0429 0.1711 0.1556 0.1163 0.6506 
0.150588 0.130714 0.210638 0.162222 0.11625 0.770413 
0.1882 0.1393 0.1851 0.1889 0.1388 0.8403 
0.0988 0.0214 0.0766 0.1333 0.0863 0.4164 
0.157647 0.132857 0.107872 0.157778 0.1125 0.668654 
0.0588 0.1179 0.1302 0.1467 0.1275 0.5811 
0.16 0.126429 0.217021 0.164444 0.12 0.787894 
0.1765 0.1179 0.1736 0.1489 0.1388 0.7557 
0.162353 0.135 0.220851 0.173333 0.10875 0.800287 
0.134118 0.132857 0.219574 0.168889 0.12 0.775438 




















0.1882 0.1393 0.2004 0.1889 0.1388 0.8556 
0.148235 0.135 0.206809 0.144444 0.12375 0.758238 
0.145882 0.126429 0.210638 0.168889 0.11625 0.768088 
0.150588 0.122143 0.213191 0.137778 0.10125 0.72495 
0.1882 0.1393 0.2004 0.1889 0.1388 0.8556 
0.171765 0.132857 0.196596 0.164444 0.12375 0.789412 
0.0588 0.0321 0.0945 0.1 0.09 0.3754 
0.1882 0.1179 0.1966 0.1667 0.0863 0.7557 
0.181176 0.130714 0.201702 0.137778 0.12375 0.775121 
0.162353 0.124286 0.206809 0.173333 0.12 0.78678 
0.185882 0.122143 0.214468 0.157778 0.11625 0.796521 
0.167059 0.1475 0.206809 0.148889 0.1275 0.797756 
0.1176 0.0536 0.1226 0.1133 0.1013 0.5084 
0.155294 0.132857 0.202979 0.16 0.11625 0.76738 
0.169412 0.124286 0.194043 0.168889 0.135 0.791629 
0.1647 0.1071 0.143 0.1356 0.0975 0.6479 
0.181176 0.122143 0.208085 0.162222 0.105 0.778627 
0.181176 0.137143 0.195319 0.137778 0.12375 0.775166 
0.183529 0.132857 0.206809 0.157778 0.11625 0.797223 
0.171765 0.124286 0.199149 0.137778 0.12 0.752977 
0.174118 0.124286 0.200426 0.164444 0.11625 0.779523 
0.162353 0.126429 0.185106 0.173333 0.12 0.767221 
0.1765 0.0643 0.1162 0.1244 0.0975 0.5789 
0.169412 0.126429 0.206809 0.133333 0.10875 0.744732 
0.157647 0.124286 0.195319 0.162222 0.12375 0.763224 
0.171765 0.12 0.199149 0.137778 0.10875 0.737441 
0.0824 0.0536 0.0996 0.1111 0.0938 0.4405 
0.1765 0.1071 0.1494 0.1467 0.1238 0.7035 
0.1835 0.1179 0.1353 0.1644 0.1275 0.7286 
0.0729 0.1286 0.203 0.1556 0.0975 0.6576 
0.148235 0.12 0.200426 0.148889 0.11625 0.7338 
0.162353 0.132857 0.185106 0.173333 0.12375 0.7774 
0.174118 0.168571 0.194043 0.164444 0.12375 0.824926 
0.1835 0.1393 0.1774 0.1578 0.1163 0.7743 
0.16 0.075 0.0791 0.0911 0.12 0.5252 
0.0941 0.075 0.1277 0.1778 0.15 0.6246 
0.1788 0.0857 0.18 0.1667 0.1163 0.7275 
0.178824 0.141429 0.190213 0.135556 0.10875 0.75477 
0.185882 0.135 0.200426 0.162222 0.0975 0.78103 
0.1482 0.1393 0.1813 0.1422 0.12 0.731 
















































0.1835 0.1179 0.1417 0.1422 0.1463 0.7316 
0.169412 0.124286 0.210638 0.18 0.105 0.789336 
0.174118 0.117857 0.18766 0.157778 0.105 0.742412 
0.1765 0.075 0.1966 0.1489 0.1238 0.7208 
0.1647 0.1393 0.1226 0.18 0.1013 0.7079 
0.167059 0.126429 0.195319 0.137778 0.11625 0.742834 









































97 .0215 .9988 .697298 .2256530
97 .3754 .8805 .740639 .0951681
97 .0000 .9863 .098714 .1958890
97 .0000 6.4326 1.848373 1.5644120







Valid N (lis tw ise)

























Variables  Enter ed/Removedb











All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: RPPb. 
Model Summ aryc
.581a .338 .324 1.2863945











Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1a. 
Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1, X2X3, X1X3b. 
Dependent Variable: RPPc. 
ANOVAc
79.396 2 39.698 23.990 .000a
155.552 94 1.655
234.948 96













Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1a. 
Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1, X2X3, X1X3b. 
























6.762 1.037 6.520 .000
-3.363 .607 -.485 -5.539 .000
-3.447 1.440 -.210 -2.393 .019
6.922 1.043 6.636 .000
-2.746 .699 -.396 -3.928 .000
-4.258 1.504 -.259 -2.832 .006
-4.583 2.604 -.442 -1.760 .082



















Dependent Variable: RPPa. 
Variables  Enter ed/Removedb











All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: RPSb. 
Model Summ aryc
.544a .296 .281 1.3834073











Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1a. 
Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1, X2X3, X1X3b. 































75.720 2 37.860 19.782 .000a
179.899 94 1.914
255.619 96













Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1a. 
Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1, X2X3, X1X3b. 
Dependent Variable: RPSc. 
Coefficientsa
6.915 1.115 6.200 .000
-3.018 .653 -.418 -4.623 .000
-4.273 1.549 -.249 -2.759 .007
7.016 1.138 6.163 .000
-2.894 .763 -.400 -3.794 .000
-4.485 1.641 -.262 -2.733 .008
-.971 2.843 -.090 -.342 .733












































.581a .338 .324 1.2863945











Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1a. 
Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1, X2X3, X1X3b. 



















Dependent Variable: RPPa. 
Model Summ aryc
.544a .296 .281 1.3834073











Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1a. 
Predictors: (Constant), X2, X1, X2X3, X1X3b. 








































Dependent Variable: RPSa. 
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